I have an idea that I don’t like. It is an idea I feel downright guilty for even having. I have alternately attempted to ignore, suppress and disprove it with limited success. I am usually able to quash it under a heap of other, nobler, cognitive concerns, but like the pernicious weed that it is, it finds a way to creep into the most innocuous of thoughts. And, despite my better judgment, I find myself dwelling on it yet again. So I am going to have to resort to confession, that age-old sacrament that can at first feel as burdensome as the transgression to be confessed, in the hope that it will grant me some respite from my torment. The idea is this: socio-political egalitarianism, at least in its purest form: the unchallengeable supremacy of equal individual human dignity (not necessarily equal situation), is not a stable equilibrium. And, in the long run, it will find itself overrun by more stable socio-political organizations.
While the vast majority might find this obvious, inconsequential or both – it has rocked me to my core, shaking beliefs I didn’t even know I held so strongly. It is worth noting some assumptions I have about this idealized egalitarianism (that I am quick to point out doesn’t, in my opinion, exist in its purest form anywhere in the modern world):
- The first is that this is the most moral (and by extension the best) form of socio-political organization that can exist. All the moral philosophies that I consider defensible, from Nozick’s ultra-libertarianism to Rawlsian redistributive justice have at their core, I believe, an assumption that people matter a lot, and that they all matter the same. Even though these moral philosophers disagree violently on how this should translate into political organization or alternatively, what the idealized egalitarianism would look like, they come together on the point that every voice, every life, is inherently equally important.
- The second is a mere derivative of the first, a society that does not treat this democratic ideal as a constraint on its actions (even if the maximization of this ideal for the largest number is their final goal) is guilty of a moral deficiency.
- The third is that, because I don’t believe this exists in its purest form anywhere today, I consider all modern societies somewhat morally deficient, however, in Orwellian prose: some are more morally deficient than others. Put another way, success at embodying the treatise that people matter a lot, and that they all matter the same is not a binary. There is a gradient and some socio-political organizations (or societies) have more grievously offended the rule than others. For example, I would argue that slavery is more egregious than a caste system which is more egregious than unregulated capitalism and so on…
I am not sure where I first picked up the idea that in the long run the more just system will win. I’m sure one part of it is the way history is taught, we are always somehow at the apex of our social organization, which, if heard enough times, would lead one to believe that we are – allowing for unfortunate bumps along the way – moving steadily towards a fairer, better world. America is a classic example, first no one was subject to the King, then slaves weren’t subject to masters, then women could vote, then racist laws were outlawed then congress gave an official apology to the Japanese Americans in internment camps… You get the sense that despite the hardest efforts of the colonist, the racist and the chauvinist what is morally right will persevere.
Then came World War II, which allowed us to prove, from the Darwinian adage of survival of the fittest, that egalitarianism was indeed the fittest socio-political form. Capitalism won over communism because it had to, the more morally defensible system always does. And in case anyone had any doubts, the dregs of the USSR and the beautifully graffitied Berlin Wall are textbook reminders. For as long as I can remember I have been confident in the supremacy of egalitarianism and then something happened.
I’m not quite sure what that “something” was. It probably had something to do with Uganda and its controversial President Museveni. He was once the darling of development workers around the world for leading a guerilla war against the infamous Ugandan despot Idi Amin and successfully leading his nation through the AIDS crisis with a success not seen anywhere else in Africa. Now, Museveni is anathema to my political science comrades. The protracted rebel activity in the North of the country that he appears to have some hand in orchestrating devastated the region. To say that his political opponents face an unfriendly climate is a gross understatement as photos of his chief rival to the presidency being hauled into the back of a police van show. And democrats everywhere let out a collective sigh when he led a constitutional amendment to remove the term limit on the presidency as his limit was about to come up. Yet it is hard to argue that by every measure of economic development Museveni has been, and continues to be, very good for Uganda, and Ugandans know it – which is why they keep voting for him. Ironically, the iron grip that he has kept over every facet of political activity appears to be the secret weapon that has allowed him to turn a nation in its dying throes into a strong competitor in the region that, by all estimates, looks poised to accelerate its strong growth. This is in sharp contrast to its significantly more “democratic” neighbor, Kenya (although Kenya itself remains a painfully far cry from the idealized egalitarianism referred to earlier), whose economy as sputtered and stalled over the same time period.
Of course, anecdote and evidence are not synonyms. There are too many variables in the economic growth of sub-Saharan Africa, from corruption to famine, to draw too strong conclusions. But it left me thinking…
Maybe it was the horror of the American media on the benevolent Norwegian judicial system. The maximum sentence available to judges in Norway is 21 years, and their prisons offer a higher standard of living than many low-income Americans experience. Halden Prison, which critics have dubbed the world’s most luxurious high-security spa, offers inmates private rooms with baths, flat screen TVs, mini-fridges and the opportunity to take cooking and drawing classes. It is based on the premise that convicted murderers and rapists, as well as hardened and violent criminals have a better chance of rehabilitation if they're treated humanely during their incarceration. Put another way, in Norway, people matter, all people, even the murderers and rapists. Despite my convictions on the morality of idealized egalitarianism, as an economist, I cringe at this. This is what I would introduce to microeconomics students as a classic perverse incentive. If the punishment for violent crime is a joke, you will see more violent crime! Then again, Norway’s incarceration rate at 66 per 100,000 citizens in one of the lowest in Europe, so I’m reworking that lesson plan.
Of course, we know how to treat criminals in the United States – we imprison such a comparatively large proportion of our population that we should! We also have the worst murder rate in the developed world and recidivism is all but a given for our serious criminals. And what system, pray tell, is so lax as to be responsible for these abysmal statistics? This piece by Louis Thoreux sheds some light; in it he describes Miami’s penitentiary system:
The place has to be seen to be believed. Up to 24 inmates are crowded into a single cell, living behind metal bars on steel bunks, sharing a single shower and two toilets.
Little of the bright Miami sun filters through the grilles on the windows. Visits to the yard happen twice a week for an hour. The rest of the time, inmates are holed up round the clock, eating, sleeping, and going slightly crazy.
But what is most shocking is the behaviour of the inmates themselves. For reasons that remain to some extent opaque—perhaps because of the bleak conditions they live in or because of insufficient supervision by officers, maybe because they lack other outlets for their energies, or because of their involvement with gangs on the outside, or maybe from a warped jailhouse tradition—the incarcerated here have created a brutal gladiatorial code of fighting.
They fight for respect, for food and snacks, or simply to pass the time.
With around 7,000 inmates, the Miami jail system is one of the biggest in America—a so-called "mega-jail". Most of these inmates are on remand—awaiting bail or being held until their trial dates—usually for fairly minor offences.
Even before one looks at the results, the Norwegian judicial system holds a much higher regard for human dignity than the American one – and all the evidence proves that the more moral system is also the more effective one. But one of these countries is a world super power and the other is…well, Norway. And one of these countries could completely wipe the other off the face of the earth in under three hours without breaking a sweat – and the other would have no form of recourse.
“Cum hoc ergo propter hoc!” I hear you cry, after all, America isn’t a world power because of its harsh judicial system (and Norway isn’t a non-world power because of its benevolent one). Or is it? Might there be a relationship between the efficient disposal of the members of society we deem inconvenient and the cut-throat innovation that has propelled America to the pinnacle of the world economic order? Might there be a link between the abhorrence for inequality that motivates Norwegian society to develop its elaborate social safety nets and rehabilitation programs and their comfort with strong but not rockstar economic status? It leaves me thinking…
What if there is actually a trade-off between economic and military supremacy on one hand, and the inherent supremacy and equality of individual dignity on the other? What if idealized egalitarianism is not the best way for a society to grow?
I’ve recently been studying pre-modern human history and it appears to confirm this hypothesis. Human societies started off as collections of hunter-gatherers, then bands of food producers, bands developed into tribes, tribes consolidated as chiefdoms and some chiefdoms were able to form states. Each subsequent designation supported orders of magnitude more people, was better organized, developed more complex forms of art and culture and would unequivocally overcome any below it in conflict. Indeed while a few smaller groups of people independently consolidated over their free will, the pattern of human history is that consolidation happened as a result of conquest, or response to the threat of conquest. Unlike what I was led to believe, most people don’t become a nation because they all hold to some common noble ideals they must band together to embody. They become part of a nation because they have no other choice. And unlike what I was led to believe, that consolidation nearly always carries with it a loss of the individual autonomy and equality of human dignity that I believe is the most moral form of socio-political organization.
I am particularly fond of how Jared Diamond puts it in Guns, Germs and Steel: human socio-political development has been a steady move “from egalitarianism to kleptocracy” (a term he uses to describe the transfer of net wealth from the commoners to the upper classes). And kleptocracy has its benefits, it allows for specialization, we diverge into all manner of producers and thinkers (those who do and those who decide what everyone else will do). Craftsmen and artists produce beautiful culture, builders and farmers house and feed us all, armies became expert war winners and an aristocracy ensures it all works smoothly. The bands stood no chance against the tribes, the tribes no chance against the chiefdoms (as happened in much of Africa) and the chiefdoms no chance against the states (as happened when Europeans arrived on the eastern North American coast).
It is ironic that in the last few hundred years, these ultra-kleptocratic societies have began to feel an urge to return to their egalitarian roots. The common man has taken to the streets, produced treatises and picked up weapons to assert their right to be the sole determinants of their lives, to make their voices heard and affirm their equal inherent dignity.
And the common man has been moderately successful, we celebrate those successes every time a country commemorates its independence, people remember a fallen civil rights activist or freedom fighter and a teenager casts their first vote.
But in the broader strokes of history, those blips are not strong enough to constitute a trend and the rest of history raises unnerving questions:
- Has globalization merely changed the scope of the kleptocracy so that the developed world can support a nation of the upper classes on nations of commoners in the developing world?
- Has the push for egalitarian ideals in the West left those nations fundamentally weakened against emerging nations that are not so easily put off by inequality and authoritarianism?
- Have the blips, nations that appear to have embraced egalitarianism and stronger economic growth, merely engaged in an elaborate form of duplicity, merely fooling their citizens of their equality?
But the most challenging claim of this thesis, the reason I am still plagued with guilt for having it, is this: If egalitarianism really is as unstable as I have claimed – because those under it will either abandon it for greater economic power or be overcome by those with economic power – then, in the long run, our choice is not fundamentally between egalitarianism and hierarchy as I had stipulated in my previous post, but between hierarchy and hierarchy.
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